The National Response Plan (NRP) established in December 2004 under the guidance of Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge was designed, “To establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.” (NRP, 2) If one assesses the federal government’s response based on the NRP a clearer and more accurate picture of the efforts to deal with the Hurricane Katrina incident can be painted. The effectiveness of the NRP in accomplishing the four aforementioned goals of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery in the wake of hurricane Katrina as well as the federal government’s adherence to the NRP will be discussed herein.
Prevention & Preparedness-
Will Bunch made several negative assertions in his Philadelphia Daily News column Attytood on August 30, 2005 in an article entitled “When the Levee Breaks.” Bunch, along with many others nationwide, seems to feel that the federal government could have prevented the effects of a category five hurricane from being so disastrous; the federal government could have imposed their power over nature. He and others called for a shoring up of the levees around Lake Pontchartrain and named the federal government as the party responsible for doing so, not the local or state governments. Bunch and others claim that the Bush administration cut spending on the SELA project that was designed to help improve flood control in the Southeast Louisiana area, redirecting funds to homeland security and the war in Iraq. It is important to note that not one successful terrorist attack on the United States has taken place since the inception of the Department of Homeland Security which to me indicates that there has been some money well spent on this endeavor. With regard to the war in Iraq, there was overwhelming support from both the Senate and the House of Representatives on October 11, 2002 when the vote was made to authorize a use of force, in fact both senators Breaux and Landrieu of Louisiana voted in favor of the resolution to authorize the use of force. One must also consider the fact that funding to the SELA project was only cut starting in 2003, just two years short of the intended stop date of project funding. What this means is that after eight years of funding the SELA project the levees were still in such bad shape that they did not withstand the force of Hurricane Katrina. What this also means is that critics like Bunch feel that just two more years of federal support for the SELA project would have been enough to prevent the effects of a category five hurricane, even though the levees were reportedly sinking at a rate of four feet annually in some of the worst spots along the line. Lastly, this means that the state and local governments of Louisiana refused to pick up just two years of expenses funding the SELA project at the risk of offending their constituents with higher taxes. Why did the local and state governments not assume the responsibility of shoring up the levees if it was known how serious the situation was in advance as critics say the federal government knew?
There are two more things that should be considered when discussing prevention and preparedness with regard to the Hurricane Katrina incident. CNN, one of the biggest critics so far of the federal government’s response to the Hurricane Katrina Incident, reported on August 29, 2005 that, “About 70 percent of New Orleans is below sea level, and is protected from the Mississippi River by a series of levees.” The article went on to state that, “Forecasters predicted the storm surge could reach 28 feet; the highest levees around New Orleans are 18 feet high.” Considering these reports one must conclude that the levees protecting New Orleans would have had to be raised at least ten (10) feet in all areas (more in some areas) to withstand the surge of the storm. This strikes me as a very unachievable project to attempt within two years, especially with the reported rate of settlement (sinking rate) by members of the Army Corps of Engineers in the year prior to the incident.
One should also consider that on Sunday, August 28, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin declared a state of emergency and ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city. Those that chose to stay behind did so knowing the risk. In the Center for Disease Control’s list of Key Facts About Hurricane Readiness they say, “Because of the destructive power of a hurricane, you should never ignore an evacuation order. Authorities will be most likely to direct you to leave if you are in a low-lying area, or within the greatest potential path of the storm.” Remembering that 70 percent of New Orleans is below sea level and heeding the warnings of the mayor and other government agencies would have led most wise people to follow evacuation orders and leave the city and surrounding areas. The people who stayed are now criticizing the federal government for a slow response to the disaster in a way that indicates ignorance of the fact that they [the residents that stayed] themselves were very slow to respond to the orders for evacuation. With approximately twenty-four (24) hours notice given to residents to evacuate it is difficult to sympathize with those that did not listen to the orders unless there was a physical or mental impairment that prevented them from complying.
Response-
Hurricane Katrina could very easily fall into three different incident annexes when attempting to classify the incident. The hurricane could be classified as a catastrophic incident due to the destruction that was caused by the incident. The amount of displaced people, structural damage and environmental and commercial impacts could certainly lead one to the conclusion that this was a catastrophic incident. The hurricane could also fall under the category of Food and Agricultural Incident as it was a, “major disaster, or other emergency involving the Nation’s agriculture and food systems.” (NRP, 2) Larry Neumeister of the Associated Press reported Hurricane Katrina’s damage to agriculture in the Gulf states as having topped three billion dollars as of September 14. The last incident annex that hurricane Katrina could fall under is the Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex due to the fact that it is a “nationally significant oil and hazardous materials pollution incident.” (NRP, 2) There are different support plans and operational procedures associated with each incident index. The difficulty in classifying Katrina could have led to some confusion when attempting to apply a plan that had only been fully in place for ten (10) months prior to such a catastrophic incident. The application of varying incident plans could cause the insufficient or inappropriate allocation of resources as well as problems within the chain of command. It was very important for the federal government to evaluate the incident thoroughly before managing it ineffectively. Unfortunately this can, and in fact did, take time. As most members of the first responder community are aware, it does not do much good to rush into an incident and cause undue harm or damage to responders and resources when there are already so many people suffering from the incident; it does not help to send responders in (national guard, fire department, police, FEMA, etc.) if the incident will cause the loss of their lives too. The federal government made a calculated judgment when responding to Hurricane Katrina, which was necessary to preserve the safety of responders.
Recovery-
C-130’s are in the air, troops, experts, volunteers and NGO’s are on the ground and the recovery effort is on its way. Critics still claim that the process is taking too long but one must think back to what was stated earlier about response. The health and welfare of responders must be taken into account when implementing recovery efforts. Responders are being sent in with the task of saving lives and property, not with the task of ending their own life. This is, and will be, a slow process while dangers still exist and the situation evolves. The stability of structures, pathogen hazards and environmental hazards, as well as the fact that we are still in hurricane season and could possibly face more meteorological problems before the recovery process is concluded all must be considered. Removing national guardsmen from their families and places of employment, mobilizing volunteers and NGO’s and allocating billions of dollars in financial aid is a process that should not happen overnight. Approximately two thirds of the people polled recently in a variety of different polls feel that response and relief efforts have been too slow. I would venture a guess that at least two thirds of the population of the U.S. have never seen or heard of the NRP and have no experience with working in emergency situations. I would also venture a guess that more than ninety-nine (99) percent of the U.S. population has never experienced the effects of anything greater than a category three hurricane, especially since only three category five hurricanes have made landfall in the U.S. since the hurricane rating system was developed. All of the Monday morning quarterbacks that are criticizing the efforts should try and focus on the positives and recognize that efforts to improve conditions are being made after an incident that is unimaginable to the majority of us.
Conclusion-
The burden of responsibilities for efforts in preventing and preparing for Hurricane Katrina should have been the burden of local and state governments in Louisiana and other affected areas. The federal government did recognize that there was a problem with the levees prior to Hurricane Katrina and made efforts to improve the levees and assist the local and state governments with funding. Any monies that were diverted from the SELA assistance plan were done so immediately before the planned conclusion of the SELA plan and in most cases were diverted for programs and endeavors necessary for the betterment and security of the United States as a whole. The response and recovery efforts in the Hurricane Katrina incident have been slow but very calculated. The slow, calculated efforts are necessary for the preservation of responder safety and welfare. Individuals must be held accountable for their own safety and cannot expect the federal government to make all decisions for them. If a person is told to evacuate and chooses to stay, then they must be willing to accept the conditions that lay ahead of them and are not in a position to complain about response time. The federal government is fulfilling its responsibilities in accordance with the predetermined guidelines established in the NRP and should be applauded for its efforts thus far.
Ryan Murphy
yannnik@aol.com
Mr. Murphy is a teacher of U.S. History and Government on Long Island. He is a member of the United States Capitol and Supreme Court Historical Societies, as well as a member of the National Council for the Social Studies and the American Historical Association. He was a participant at the State Department’s Foreign Policy Teacher’s Forum in 2005.
Mr. Murphy is also a firefighter on Long Island and a past-Chairman of Fire Prevention, recognized by Suffolk County Fire Educators Association as an outstanding Fire and Life Safety Educator. He has also recived numerous FEMA certifications during his tenure in the fire service.
